

19 APR 1972

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STATINTL

Jordan Sent Jets to Pakistan Despite Ban, U.S. Confirms

By Jesse W. Lewis Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department confirmed yesterday that about 10 U.S. provided Jordanian air force F-104 jet fighters were in Pakistan during the recent Pakistani-Indian war despite a standing ban on the unauthorized transfer of U.S. military equipment to third countries.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey also said the U.S. government has questioned Libya about reports that three F-5 jets were sent to Pakistan. According to the reports, those planes arrived after the fighting stopped, he said.

"Based on information available to us," McCloskey said, "we understand that approximately 10 F-104s from Jordan were in Pakistan during the recent hostilities."

"We were informed that these aircraft remained under Jordanian control and were returned to Jordan with the possible exception of one plane," He said. He had no information on whether the planes were used in combat or whether Jordanian or Pakistani pilots flew them.

However, officials said privately that it is unlikely that future U.S. military aid to Jordan would be affected.

Jordan is scheduled to receive between 12 and 24 U.S. manufactured F-5s, a low-cost, multi-purpose jet fighter, over the next two years, and other hardware.

McCloskey said that State Department policy and legal experts were studying the

facts "in light of the Foreign Assistance Act."

The law that governs U.S. military assistance to foreign countries forbids the transfer of the equipment to a third country unless authorized by the United States, a U.S. official said.

McCloskey said that within the past year "the United States has not authorized any transfer of U.S. military equipment."

A U.S. official said there was "surprise" in Washington when confidential reports indicated that Jordan had sent the planes to Pakistan. He also said King Hussein was asked about the reports in Amman and that it was discussed with him during his visit to Washington last month.

The U.S. policy of pro-Pakistan "tilt" was probably sensed by Jordan. It apparently felt obligated in any case to aid its Moslem ally Pakistan because of Pakistani assistance during Jordan's civil war of September 1970.

During that conflict, Pakistani air force officers played operational and tactical roles in helping Jordan to repel Syrian tanks that crossed the border to attack Jordanian positions.

The Jordanian jets in Pakistan have been an embarrassment for the United States.

At a secret White House meeting during the recent Pakistan-Indian war, presiden-

tial adviser Henry A. Kissinger reportedly asked if the United States "had the right" to transfer U.S. arms from Jordan or Saudi Arabia to Pakistan as an effort to "tilt" U.S. policy in Pakistan's favor. He was told by a State Department official that it would be illegal. Minutes of the meeting were leaked to columnist Jack Anderson.

Shortly after Anderson's disclosure, King Hussein told a U.S. embassy official in Amman, Jordan, that he was dismayed and surprised that Jordan's confidential inquiry about aiding its ally Pakistan would appear in the press.

Visit by Hussein

When King Hussein was visiting Washington last month, the issue surfaced again in a New York Times dispatch from Pakistan reporting that both Jordan and Libya had sent U.S.-supplied fighter planes to Pakistan.

During an interview with this reporter, the king indirectly confirmed the report, but said he was perplexed that it came up during his visit.

The State Department declined to comment on it at the time to avoid further embarrassment to the king while he was here. King Hussein left the United States at noon yesterday after a vacation in Florida. Yesterday, at the noon State Department briefing, the issue was discussed for the first time.

U.S. Discussions of Indian-Pakistani War

Texts of Secret Documents on Top-Level

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—Following are the texts of three secret documents made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group on the crisis between India and Pakistan:

Memo on Dec. 3 Meeting

Secret Sensitive

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Refer to: 1-29643/71

International Security Affairs
Memorandum for Record

SUBJECT

WSAG meeting on India/Pakistan participants.

Assistant to the President for national security affairs—Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State—John N. Irwin

Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard

Director, Central Intelligence Agency—Richard M. Helms

Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.)—Maurice J. Williams

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Assistant Secretary of State (N.E.A.R.)—Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)—G. Warren Nutter

Assistant Secretary of State (I.O.)—Samuel De Palma

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)—Armistead I. Selden Jr.

Assistant Administrator (A.I.D./N.E.A.)—Donald G. MacDonald

TIME AND PLACE

3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room, White House.

SUMMARY

Reviewed conflicting reports about major actions in the west wing. C.I.A. agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving \$99-million, and a hold on further action implementing the \$7-million P.L. 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March, 1959, bilateral U. S. agreement with Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do to an end and it is useless to think of comes out otherwise.

HELMS: Concerning the reported action in the west wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie. In the east wing the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved.

KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing territory?

HELMS: Yes; small bits of territory, definitely.

SISCO: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is happening in the West—is a full-scale attack likely?

MOORER: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant numbers of Indian combat aircraft.

HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30 may well announce recognition of Bangladesh.

MOORER: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during late afternoon, which doesn't make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this yet.

KISSINGER: Is it possible that the Indians attacked first and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in response?

MOORER: This is certainly possible.

KISSINGER: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the \$99-million credit. He wants the \$72-million P.L. 480 credit also held.

WILLIAMS: Word will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that?

KISSINGER: That is his order, but I will check with the President again. If asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being suspended in view of conditions on the subcontinent. The next issue is the U.N.

IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans toward making a U.S. move in the U.N. soon.

KISSINGER: The President is in favor of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation, we must rely on U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal!

KISSINGER: The earlier draft for Bush is too even-handed.

SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

SISCO: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation "under review."

KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

PACKARD: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are so near the weekend.

KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March, 1959, bilateral agreement.

Prepared by:

/S/ initials

JAMES M. NOYES

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

Approved:

(illegible signature)

For G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Distribution: Secdef, Depsecdef, CJCS, ASD(ISA), PDASD(ISA), DASD: NEASA & PPNSCA, Dcp Dir: NSCC & PPNSCA, DASD: MIS

STATINT

continued

Kissinger: 'I Am Getting Hell...From the President'

Following is a typescript of the secret documents turned over to The Washington Post yesterday by Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson.

SECRET SENSITIVE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Refer to: 1-29643/71
DEGRADED AT 12 YEARS INTERVALS
(Illegible)
Not Automatically Declassified
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting on India/Pakistan

Participants: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State—John N. Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard
Director, Central Intelligence Agency—Richard M. Helms
Deputy Administrator (AID)—Maurice J. Williams II
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Admiral Thomas Moorer
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Assistant Administrator (AID/NEA)—Donald G. MacDonald
Time and Place: 3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room, White House.

SUMMARY:

Reviewed conflicting reports about major action in the West Wing. CIA agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving \$99 million.

further action implementing the \$72 million PL 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March 1959 bilateral U.S. agreement with Pakistan.

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HELMIS: Concerning the reported action in the West Wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankat, and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials says this is a lie. In the East Wing, the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved.

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Prepared by:

/s/initials

James H. Noyes
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

Approved:

Illegible signature
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STATINTL

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Secret Minutes Dispute Kissinger

By Jack Anderson

We can now document from secret White House minutes our charge that presidential braintrustor Henry Kissinger lied to reporters when he told them the Nixon administration wasn't anti-India.

Contrary to Kissinger's statement to the press, the minutes show that President Nixon not only ordered a pro-Pakistan policy but became furious with his subordinates for not taking a stronger stand against India.

"I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India," complained Kissinger at the Dec. 3 strategy session.

Three days later, according to the minutes, Kissinger "directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians. The Indian ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

The India-Pakistan conflict was reviewed almost daily by a crisis team known as the Washington Special Action Group. Here's a typical ex-

cerpt from the secret minutes for Dec. 4:

"Mr. Helms (the CIA director) opened the meeting by indicating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack of East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides... Although not decreeing a formal declaration of war, President Yahya has stated that 'the final war with India is upon us'..."

"Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full scale invasion, this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement."

"Mr. Helms indicated that we do not know who started the current action..."

"Dr. Kissinger requested that by Monday the CIA prepare an account of who did what to whom and when."

"Mr. DePalma (Assistant State Secretary) suggested that if we refer to the Indian declaration in our discussion in the UN, that we almost certainly will have to refer to remarks by Yahya."

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he was under specific instructions from the President, and either someone in the bureaucracy would have to prepare this statement along the lines indicated or that it would be done in the White House.

Kissinger's Semantics

"Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Indians have stated anything to the effect that they were in an all-out war."

"Mr. Helms said that the terminology was 'no holds barred.'

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Later in the meeting, Kissinger instructed: "On AID matters, the President wants to proceed against India only."

The secret minutes of the December 8 meeting shed more light on this:

"Dr. Kissinger emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, (surplus) commodities or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White House.

"Mr. Williams (Deputy AID Director) stated there was no problem of anything sliding through."

"Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be."

"Mr. Williams said that the only other possible option was taking a position concerning AID material currently under contract. This, however, would be a very messy problem inasmuch as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit..."

"Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget for India only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

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STATINTL

Probe Is On To Find Leak To Anderson

Associated Press

U.S. officials said yesterday a security investigation is under way to find out who "leaked" to a columnist inside information about White House strategy sessions early this month concerning the India-Pakistan conflict.

The officials, who declined to be identified by name, voiced concern about the publication of the material by columnist Jack Anderson.

Anderson columns have been quoting from what Anderson says are classified reports. They deal in part with suggestions by some administration officials that some countries such as Jordan be allowed to transfer U.S.-furnished arms to Pakistan.

The administration did not engage in such transfers, and maintained its embargo on weapons deliveries to Pakistan.

Some of Anderson's material is said to come from meetings of the special action group that deliberated U.S. India-Pakistan policy at the White House during the first days of December.

The group is led by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, head of the White House National Security Council staff, and includes senior representatives from concerned agencies such as the State Department, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

U.S., Soviet Vessels in Bay of Bengal

By Jack Anderson

A dangerous confrontation is developing between Soviet and American naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

President Nixon has ordered a naval task force into those troubled waters as a restraint upon India. Now heading for the Bay of Bengal are the aircraft carrier Enterprise, amphibious assault ship Tripoli, guided missile frigate King, and guided missile destroyers Parsons, Decatur and Tartar Sam.

At the same time, Soviet naval ships have been spotted steaming into the Bay of Bengal ostensibly to bolster India.

Even more ominous, intelligence reports claim that Soviet technicians are aboard Indian naval craft that have attacked Pakistani harbor and shore installations. U.S., British and other foreign merchant ships have been hit in these attacks.

Rockets fired from under the ocean have also been tracked. The Pakistani Navy has urgently requested U.S. help in determining whether the rockets could have been launched from a Soviet submarine.

Inside the White House, meanwhile, the President has made no attempt to hide his favoritism for Pakistan. He has developed a close personal

relationship with Pakistan's dynamic President Yahya Khan.

Mr. Nixon, accordingly, has ordered his crisis team, known formally as the Washington Special Action Group, to find ways short of direct intervention to help Pakistan. The hush-hush group, headed by presidential policymaker Henry Kissinger, has been meeting almost daily in the White House's fabled secret Situation Room since the Indian-Pakistani outbreak.

Nixon's Secret Ire

At the Dec. 3 meeting Kissinger snorted: "I'm getting hell every half-hour from the President that we're not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He doesn't believe we're carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

Adm. Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed the military situation. CIA Chief Richard Helms also reported what his agents had found out about the fighting. Then Kissinger brought up the United Nations.

"If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively," he growled, "its utility has come to an end, and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East."

"We'll have a recommenda-

tion for you this afternoon," promised Assistant State Secretary Joseph Sisco.

"We have to take action," pressed Kissinger. "The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear."

"That's ideal!" retorted Sisco cheerily.

There was discussion about a statement that had been prepared for Ambassador George Bush to deliver at the U.N. Kissinger thought it was "too evenhanded" and ought to be tougher on India.

To maintain a diplomatic balance, Sisco suggested that economic steps could be taken against India but that similar moves against Pakistan should be announced as "under review."

"It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan," grumped Kissinger, "if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step."

U.S. Too Gentle?

At the next secret meeting on Dec. 4, Kissinger reported that the President was still fuming over the gentle treatment U.S. spokesmen were giving India.

"The President is under the illusion that he is giving instructions," said Kissinger, "not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress."

Mr. Nixon, meanwhile, has disregarded several secret, ur-

gent appeals from Kenneth Keating, the American Ambassador in New Delhi, that the U.S. should be careful not to alienate India.

He reported that he had received personal assurances from Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh not only that the populace welcomed the liberation of East Pakistan but that India had no intention of annexing the conquered territory. India had no wish, said Singh, to provide "even a semblance of Indian administration" but would permit the Bengalis to rule themselves.

In another secret message, Keating sharply disputed a story put out by the White House about the Indian-Pakistani developments.

"I have made the foregoing comments," he concluded, "in the full knowledge that I may not have been privy to all the important facts of this tragedy. On the basis of what I do know, I do not believe those elements of the (White House) story either add to our position or, perhaps more importantly, to our credibility."

It would be ironic if Richard Nixon, who mounted the political soapbox in times past to accuse the Democrats of "losing" China to the Communists, should be responsible for pushing India into eager Soviet arms.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.
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NEWS

E - 193,942

OCT 5 1971

LONDON CAPER ALERTS FBI*By Paul Scott*

THE BRITISH government's sensational crackdown on Soviet spying was triggered by the discovery that the Russians had stolen one of Britain's most important defense secrets.

A high-ranking Soviet official, who defected to the West during the summer, touched off the massive British espionage investigation by revealing that the Russians had obtained the blueprints of an electronic counter (EC) device capable of blacking out all ground radar detection systems.

Tremendous significance of the Soviet espionage windfall is indicated by the fact that all British aircraft carrying atomic bombs targeted for Russia are equipped with these electronic counter devices.

Tests show that the A-bombers, equipped with the "EC" device, have been able successfully to penetrate the air defenses of Russia and the U.S. without detection. The British "EC" device is regarded by American Air Force officials as the best of its type in the world.

RUSSIA'S POSSESSION of the secrets of the electronic counter device will permit Moscow to make its own and to develop effective defense measures against British A-bombers, considered to be among the most powerful in the world.

With the help of the Russian defector, the British were able to identify more than 100 Russians actively involved in approximately a half-dozen espionage rings in Great Britain and the U.S.

Details involving new Russian spy operations in this country are now being investigated by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover after being turned over to FBI agents regularly stationed in London and who took part in the questioning of the Soviet defector.

FBI Director Hoover has kept several of his top agents in London at all times because of the tremendous number of Soviet spies there.

Hoover would also like to see a crack-



HOOVER

down on Soviet-bloc spying in the U.S.

Based on the information obtained from the Soviet defector, Hoover has warned the White House that 80 per cent of all personnel assigned to Soviet diplomatic establishments here and at the United Nations are actively involved in espionage operations in the U.S.

Most disturbing to Hoover is the steady increase in Russian and Soviet-bloc diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. As of September 1, there were 1,172 Soviet bloc officials and 1,454 of their dependents in the U.S.

The buildup is evident when compared to the 806 officials and 1,174 dependents in the U.S. as of July 1, 1966. Not included in these figures are the numerous couriers, members of special delegations and other Soviet bloc officials temporarily in this country but not assigned to official establishments.

* * *

A guerrilla war is developing in East Pakistan that could become another full-scale "Vietnam" by the end of the

now being circulated among President Nixon's top foreign policy and military advisers. Prepared on the request of the White House, the intelligence estimate states that there is a real possibility of the major powers of Asia becoming involved in the fighting there.

The rising scale of the warfare in East Pakistan is indicated by the latest report from the American embassy in New Delhi. It reveals that Pakistani government soldiers are being killed at an average rate of 40 to 50 a day—or double the number of Americans now dying weekly in Vietnam.

The CIA predicts that the intensity of the fighting will grow when the monsoons end later this month. East Pakistani resistance fighters are planning a new offensive at that time aimed at completely destroying the country's communication and power system.

The 10,000 armed guerrillas now waging war in East Pakistan are being reinforced with 5,000 Mukti Bahini (liberation army) fighters, who have just finished two months of training in India or border sanctuaries controlled by the guerrillas.

ARMED WITH machine guns and skilled in demolition weapons, these new guerrilla fighters have been selected from college graduates and high school volunteers. Another 5,000 of these volunteers are now in training.

Resistance within East Pakistan is now being led by young members of the violence-prone Communist Naxalites, according to American intelligence authorities. Arms are being supplied to this group by India and the Soviet Union.

If the fighting continues to increase, the CIA forecasts that more than one million could die from famine alone within a year. There are an estimated 65 million people in East Pakistan, which has an area of 54,501 square miles.

FBI INVESTIGATES**STATE DEPT. LEAKS**

**Agents Question Personnel
— Use of Lie-Detectors
on Officials Reported**

By FRED P. GRAHAM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 2 — State Department personnel are being questioned by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an effort to determine how recent sensitive information leaked to the press, the department's press spokesman disclosed today.

The spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said in response to reporters' questions at a press briefing, that the investigation had been prompted by concern that "stories harmful to the national interest" were being disclosed by unauthorized persons. He repeatedly declined to make a denial when asked about reports that F.B.I. agents were giving State Department officials lie-detector tests in efforts to locate the sources of the news leaks.

Mr. McCloskey said the F.B.I. questioning was being done "with the approval of the Secretary of State," but he declined to say who had ordered it. Powell Moore, an official in the Justice Department's information office, said that the investigation had been ordered by that department's Internal Security Division.

Mr. Moore said that such action was taken whenever there was evidence of violations of the Federal security laws, and that the current questioning had extended to other departments, including the Pentagon. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an agency of the Justice Department.

The questioning by F.B.I. and the reported use of lie-detectors has touched sensitive nerves in the State Department, where, officials say, the bureau has not been active since it investigated charges of Communist infiltration

raised the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy two decades ago.

The State Department has its own security force that is supposed to investigate security leaks.

In recent weeks newsmen who report on the State Department have found that people there would not see them or answer their telephone calls. Today, at his regular noon briefing, Mr. McCloskey was asked a series of questions about the investigation and other official actions that have apparently prompted officials to close their doors to the press.

Taboos Conceded

Mr. McCloskey conceded that certain subjects had been temporarily placed off limits for discussion with the press by State Department personnel. These include President Nixon's coming trip to China and the one-man election campaign of South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu.

But Mr. McCloskey insisted, "I have told them that people need not close doors or refuse to return phone calls because a subject for a period may be off limits for general distribution." He said there had been no efforts to limit "contacts" between State Department personnel and the press, but only to persuade officials to "use their common sense in dealing with the journalists."

"The State Department has a deep concern, and I would expect the public in general would understand, that information that could be prejudicial to the national interest in foreign policy is not to be published or broadcast," Mr. McCloskey said.

Times Article Mentioned

He said that F.B.I. agents had approached State Department officials "on a number of occasions," but he would not say what news articles had been involved.

Some individuals who were questioned said that the agents asked about an article by William Beecher in The New York Times of July 22, giving details of United States negotiators' positions in the arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union.

Others were asked about an earlier article by Tad Szulc in The New York Times about arms shipments to Pakistan.

Mr. McCloskey said, "To the best of my knowledge, no disciplinary action has been taken against any person questioned." Asked if a reprimand or notation placed in a Foreign Service officer's record was a disciplinary action, he said that such a reprimand would not necessarily be considered a disciplinary action.

He declined to say if officials had been asked to sign affidavits saying whether they had talked to certain reporters.

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